The term “constructivism” is now shared among a wide range of perspectives and approaches. Indeed, Constructivism represents an epistemological position that arises as a common denominator of many disciplines, without being identified with any specific area. A cornerstone for those who follow this school of thought is a reflexive interpretation of knowledge which is continuously questioning itself and its own generative process: the “observed phenomenon”, in fact, cannot be separated from the “observing system” (von Foerster, 1981) From this perspective, reality is not merely a series of events that you can collect independently from the way you look at them. At the same time, neither can it be reduced to a relativism of ideas or perceptions of an individual, without recovering any shared criteria. Going beyond this ancient and unsolvable dichotomy between objective knowledge and subjective experience, constructivist epistemology looks instead to the human being as an active creator of personal theories, engaged in making sense of their world and of verifying how this sense is useful to their living. As stated by Piaget (1979), “intelligence organizes the world by organizing itself”. Therefore, knowledge, action and experience become synonymous: “the individual has no alternative but to construct what he knows on the basis of his own experience” (von Glasersfeld, 1994). At the same time, however, the other arises as a “legitimate other in coexistence with oneself” (Maturana, 1993), in mutual interaction and co-experimentation. Based on these assumptions, authors such as G. Bateson, S. Ceccato, H. von Foerster, E. von Glasersfeld, G.A. Kelly, H. Maturana and F. Varela propose a new way of looking at science and people, shifting the focus of interest and research from contents to processes, from facts to meanings.